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Abstract
Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a
perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper
presents a counterexample to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping
phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to superﬁcially similar
examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (1983),
because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke’s examples cannot
be extended to mine. If Intentionalism fails, it is impossible to reduce the
phenomenology of an experience to its content.
1 Introduction
When we look at the world, we have visual experiences. Two important features of
these experiences are their phenomenology and their content. The phenomenology
of an experience is what it is like to have it; its content is how the experience rep-
resents the world as being. INTENTIONALISM is an inﬂuential theory about how
these two features are related. The view says, roughly, that phenomenology super-
venes on content, so that any two experiences that differ in their phenomenology
differ in their content. Reﬁnements will be introduced shortly.
Interest in Intentionalism derives, at least in part, from the role it can play in
a reductive project in the philosophy of mind. We may well be able to explain the
content of mental states in naturalistically acceptable terms.1 If the phenomenol-
1For example, by giving a causal co-variation account of content, as in Fodor (1994) or Stalnaker
(1984).
1ogy and content of experience are as intimately related as Intentionalism says, we
may also be able to reduce phenomenology to content and thus make it naturalis-
tically acceptable. Indeed, this is the use to which Tye (1995) and (2000) want to
put Intentionalism. But if Intentionalism fails, that reductive project fails, as well.
That is not to say that phenomenology is completely irreducible. For all I say, we
are still free to reduce phenomenology to physical or functional properties.
In this paper, I present a counterexample to (a reﬁned version of) INTENTION-
ALISM. My counterexample is not the ﬁrst; over the last few years, several have
been proposed. One that is often thought to be the strongest appeals to the pos-
sibility of inverted spectra. Putative cases of inverted spectra are cases in which
two experiences have the same color content but different color phenomenology,
hence presenting a counterexample to INTENTIONALISM.2 However, standard ar-
guments about inverted spectra rely on substantive and controversial theories of
both the phenomenology and content of experience—and though these are widely
held, they are substantive theories.3 Such cases also interact in complex ways with
theories of color properties themselves, for instance, whether the space of color
2Ned Block considers this sort of case decisive (see e.g. Block (1996)); see also Chalmers (2004).
For a putative case of actual spectrum-inversion, see Nida-R¨ umelin (1996).
3Which controversial claims they rely on depends on how we spell out the case. There are two
majorvariants. Intheﬁrst, weconsidertwosubjects, VertandNonvertwhoarefunctionallyidentical.
They are looking at a particular red object. The proponent of spectrum inversion submits that their
experiences have the same content but different phenomenal character. This requires ﬁrst that the
content of an experience is determined independently of the phenomenal character of that experience,
perhaps by what usually causes experiences of that type. It also requires that we can compare the
phenomenal character of experiences across subjects. The ﬁrst is challenged by, e.g., Siewert (1998),
the second by Stalnaker (2003).
In the second variant, we consider a single subject in two different situations. The ﬁrst situation
is an ordinary one: she is looking at a ripe tomato. She then undergoes some physiological change
which leaves her spectrum-inverted. For example, she wakes up one morning and says that all of
a sudden, the sky looks yellow, et cetera. Nothing in her environment has changed. Perhaps on
this morning, her experience misrepresents her environment. The proponent of spectrum inversion
submits that after a period of adjustment, her experience once again veridically represents the colors
of things. The subject once again says that the sky looks blue, grass green, etc. This requires that
the content of experience can change over time in the way required by the argument, as well as that
the comparison of qualia in a single subject over time is unproblematic. Again, the ﬁrst claim is a
controversialclaimabouthowthecontentofexperienceisﬁxed; thesecondturnsouttobefalse. That
even the intra-personal case over time is at least problematic is brought out by Shoemaker (1982);
see also Harman (1999), Stalnaker (2003). These theorists differ on whether the problems can be
overcome. For a very thorough discussion of inverted qualia, see Byrne (Summer 2005).
2properties is symmetrical in the way presupposed by the argument.
In contrast to discussions of inverted spectra, my case against INTENTIONAL-
ISM focuses on a very simple counterexample involving no substantive theories of
intentionality. The case I am concerned with involves quite ordinary visual expe-
riences all readers will have had—at least by the time they have read this paper.
In the course of the paper, I’ll argue that my proposed counterexample is supe-
rior to the ones presented by Peacocke (1983) because it is immune to standard
intentionalist responses.4
After some preliminaries (section 2), I present my proposed counterexample
(section 3). I then argue that it is indeed a counterexample (section 4).
2 Content, Phenomenology, Intentionalism
2.1 The Content of Experience
To say that a state has content is to say that the state represents the world as being
some way. As such, the state either represents the world veridically or falsidically.
It is an assumption of the debate I am addressing that visual experiences have
content. Moreover, it is an assumption that there is such a thing as the content of
experience, i.e., that there is a unique way a given experience represents the world
as being.5 By a content property, I shall mean the property of havingsuch-and-such
content.
4One case I will not discuss in detail is the duck-rabbit. Two successive experiences of seeing it
as a duck and as a rabbit, respectively, differ in their phenomenology. But there is also an obvious
representational difference: in the one case, the experience represents that the lines and dots depict a
duck, in the other that they depict a rabbit. Peacocke himself dismisses the example on these grounds
(see Peacocke, 1983, p.17).
5Many theorists who otherwise disagree share the assumption that experiences have represen-
tational content, such as Heck (2000), McDowell (1994), Peacocke (1992), Evans (1982), Searle
(1983), Stalnaker (1998), Thau (2002), Tye (1995, 2000), Byrne (2001). Some theorists who deny
that experiences have content are sense-datum theorists who believe that the sense-data are not them-
selves contents, such as Russell (1912/77). For a recent denial, see Travis (2004).
32.2 The Phenomenal Character of Experience
When a subject has a perceptual experience, she is in a phenomenally impressive
state. The feature of the experience that makes it thus impressive is the phenomenal
character of the experience. By a phenomenal property I shall mean the property
of having such-and-such phenomenal character.
2.3 Intentionalism
In this paper, I will mean by INTENTIONALISM the claim:
[INTENTIONALISM] Necessarily, for a single perceiver, and restricted to visual
perception, if two experiences of this perceiver differ in their phenomenal
character, they differ in their content.
As I have formulated it, INTENTIONALISM is a relatively weak claim, and it is
defended by several theorists.6 It is merely the claim that one set of properties
supervenes on another. Stronger versions are also defended sometimes. There are
two principal ways of strengthening INTENTIONALISM. First, we can lift the re-
striction to a single perceiver and to visual perception, claiming instead that across
perceivers (and/or across modalities), the phenomenal character of two experiences
cannot vary without a difference in their respective contents. Second, we can re-
quire a different relation than mere supervenience between the phenomenal and
content properties of an experience. We might require, for example, that the prop-
erty of having phenomenal character C is identical to the property of having the
content that p, for particular C’s and p’s. The weak version will do for my pur-
poses. If I can show that it fails, any stronger version that entails it will also be
refuted.
INTENTIONALISM as I have formulated it is compatible with functionalism. In
fact, a theorist who accepts INTENTIONALISM can appeal to functional differences
between the deliverances of vision and audition to explain the difference in the
6See for example Byrne (2001), Dretske (1995), Harman (1999), Lycan (1996), Thau (2002), Tye
(1995), and (2000).
4phenomenal character of visual and auditory experiences that have the same con-
tent. She might also appeal to such functional differences to explain the difference
between seeing and believing, since at least non-occurrent beliefs do not have any
associated phenomenology.7
At this point, it is important to distinguish between two versions of INTEN-
TIONALISM. Let REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM be INTENTIONALISM with the
restriction that one must be able to understand the contents of experience indepen-
dently of the phenomenal properties of experience. Let NON-REDUCTIVE INTEN-
TIONALISM be INTENTIONALISM without any such restriction.8 I need to say a bit
more about what NON-REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM is and what it is not.
One might hold that one cannot understand what the content properties of
an experience are independently of its phenomenal properties on the following
grounds. We need to distinguish the contents of experience from other contentful
states of the agent, such as states of the visual system. A promising line of thought
holds that a state is an experiential state only if it has some phenomenal property.
So in order to identify the contents of experience, we need to have recourse to
the phenomenal properties of experience. On my understanding, holding this view
does not bar a theorist from also holding REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM.
Rather, a non-reductive intentionalist holds that we cannot understand the con-
tent properties of an experience independently of its phenomenal properties on the
following grounds. Even if we take for granted which contentful states are experi-
ential states, we still need to appeal to the phenomenal properties of experience to
explain what their contents are. That might be the case, for example, because the
7Thus, Tye (2000, p.62) appeals to a property he calls ‘being poised’ to explain the difference
between a state with the content that p that has an associated phenomenology, and one with the same
contentbutwithoutphenomenology. Theformer, butnotthelatterstate, is“poised”tohaveanimpact
on beliefs and desires. And as Tye says, the property of being poised is “essentially a functional role
one” (Tye (2000, p. 62)). Incidentally, this make Tye’s claim mysterious that the property of having
a particular phenomenal character just is the property of having a particular content, since in addition
to having a certain representational content, it is also required that the contentful state occupy a
certain functional role.
8I follow Chalmers (2004) in drawing this distinction. Paradigmatically, Shoemaker in Shoe-
maker (1994a) and (1994b) defends non-reductive INTENTIONALISM, since on Shoemaker’s view,
some of the properties represented in experience are deﬁned in terms of the phenomenal character
they are associated with.
5content of an experience includes that it has such-and-such phenomenal character.
The distinction between REDUCTIVE and NON-REDUCTIVE INTENTIONAL-
ISM is important for two reasons. One concerns the reductive project I mentioned
in the introduction. Only REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM can serve in that project.
If REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM fails, we cannot reduce phenomenal properties
to content properties.
The other reason the distinction between REDUCTIVE and NON-REDUCTIVE
INTENTIONALISM is important concerns the strategy of this paper. A defender
of NON-REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM might try to establish it by making the
following two claims:
(1) For any phenomenal character C an experience can have, the contents of that
experience can include the proposition that the experience has C.9
(2) An experience has phenomenal character C if and only if its content includes
the proposition that it has C.
If (1) and (2) are true, then there cannot be a difference in the phenomenal char-
acter of an experience without a difference in content, since phenomenal character
determines (some) content; hence, a difference in phenomenal character entails a
difference in content. Should one wish to defend INTENTIONALISM using (1) and
(2), it would still be a substantial claim, since (1) and (2) are substantial assump-
tions about experience. But one cannot argue against INTENTIONALISM by coun-
terexample, given (1) and (2).10 So my argument cannot, by itself, work against
INTENTIONALISM thus defended. I take it that it at least works against REDUC-
TIVE INTENTIONALISM, and for simplicity, I restrict myself to that claim. In what
follows, I will mean REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM by INTENTIONALISM.
9Presumably, not all propositions can be represented in experience, such as the proposition that
the number 2 is even. The restriction to phenomenal characters that an experience can have is
intended to ensure that visual experiences need only represent that they have visual phenomenal
character, and likewise for the other modalities.
10As Byrne (2001, p. 212) rightly points out, if (1) and (2) are true, even the existence of mental
paint is compatible with NON-REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM. For mental paint, see Block (1996).
63 The Counterexample
Consider Figure 1. As you look at it, you can become aware of different groupings
oftiles. DependingonhowyoulookatFigure1, youcanseevarioussetsofsquares
as prominent.
Let me number the squares as in Figure 2.
Figure 1: Tiles
1
4
7
2
5
8
3
6
9
Figure 2: Numbered Tiles
In Figure 1, you can see the squares corresponding to 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 as prominent,
or you can see 2, 4, 6, and 8 as prominent. You may also be able to see other
groupings as relatively more prominent, such as 1, 2, 3, 5, and 8, which form a ‘T’.
Consider two successive viewings of Figure 1. Suppose that you see one grouping
of tiles during the ﬁrst viewing, a different grouping during the second. You can
have these different experiences without changing where you look. For instance,
you can continue to focus your vision on the center of Figure 1 and still have the
different experiences. Let me ﬁx on one particular pair of experiences and name
them:
[E1] You are looking at Figure 1, and you see the corner and center tiles (1, 3, 5,
7, 9) as prominent.
[E2] You are looking at Figure 1, and you see the four tiles in the middle of each
side (2, 4, 6, 8) as prominent.
I will argue that E1 and E2 are a counterexample to INTENTIONALISM: they form
a pair of experiences that are had by the same perceiver, are both visual percep-
tions, have the same content, but differ in their phenomenology. That E1 and E2
7differ in their visual phenomenology seems clear enough. To be sure, ‘visual phe-
nomenology’ is a term of art, and perhaps the intentionalist could deny that the
introspectible difference between the experiences is a difference in their phenom-
enal properties. For the purposes of this paper, I’ll rest with our intuition that the
difference is in the phenomenal properties.
4 Same Content
My argument for the claim that E1 and E2 have the same content consists of two
parts. I will successively argue for these claims:
[PW] The contents of E1 and E2 do not diverge in truth-value in any possible
world.
[SAMENESS] There is no further difference between the contents of E1 and E2.
It follows that E1 and E2 have the same content. Splitting the argument up in this
way allows me to separate two kinds of responses on behalf of INTENTIONALISM:
those that deny the ﬁrst part, and those that deny the second.
4.1 Arguing for PW
Any given content determines a set of possible worlds: the set of worlds in which
the content is true. This follows simply from the claim that if a state has content, it
represents the world as being a certain way, and hence can represent it veridically
or falsidically. Further, everyone will agree that it is sufﬁcient for two contents to
be distinct that they disagree in truth-value with respect to some possible world.11
In this section, I will argue that this sufﬁcient condition for the contents of E1 and
E2 to be distinct is not met. Now, merely arguing for PW is insufﬁcient to establish
that the contents of E1 and E2 are the same, since we might individuate contents
moreﬁnelythanbysetsofpossibleworlds. Inthatcase, wecouldhaveadistinction
between the contents of the two states without there being any world in which they
11Thus, the arguments I consider are independent of any commitment to possible worlds seman-
tics, either for content-bearing states in general or experiential states in particular.
8diverge in truth-value. SAMENESS rules out this possibility, and I will argue for it
in the next section.
My strategy for defending PW is to consider some ways of denying it and to
show that none of them are compelling. I follow this strategy, because I think it
is intuitively plausible that the two experiences represent the world as being the
same way.12 So it seems best to proceed by considering attempts to articulate such
a difference, and see how they fare.
First Proposal The proponent of INTENTIONALISM might start by pointing to
the feature of grouping itself. On this proposal, E1 represents the squares as
grouped one way, while E2 represents them as grouped another way. Depending on
what the property of being grouped amounts to, their extensions may not diverge
in any possible world. So right now, this is just a redescription of the problem.
In response, the proponent of INTENTIONALISM might describe the difference
between the two experiences—their grouping phenomenology—in terms of promi-
nence: in E1, certain squares are prominent, in E2 others. This leaves open whether
the property of being prominent is a dispositional or a relational property. Suppose
that being prominent is a dispositional property. That is, being prominent is the
property of tending to appear prominent to creatures with our particular visual sys-
tems when they are in the sort of state that gives rise to the prominence effect. If
that is the right way to understand the dispositional reading of being prominent,
then the property that the ﬁrst grouping (1, 3, 5, 7, and 9) has does not diverge in
any possible world from the dispositional property the second grouping (2, 4, 6,
and 8) has. For all that is required in order for a group of squares to have either
12Incidentally, Wittgenstein seems to hold the same position. In considering the duck-rabbit, he
says that we are torn between two descriptions of what has gone on: on the one hand, you might
describe the change as a change in the way the world appears; on the other, you might describe the
change as occurring in the face of an unchanging world. He considers an interlocutor who says: “But
surely you would say that the picture is altogether different now!”. To this Wittgenstein responds:
“But what is different: my impression? my point of view?–Can I say? I describe the alteration like
a perception; quite as if the object had altered before my eyes.” (Wittgenstein (1953, Part II, xi))
Wittgenstein says that it is as if the object had altered, though he does not endorse that description
either. Rather, he goes on to say, “the expression of a change in aspect is the expression of a new
perception and at the same time of the perception’s being unchanged.” (ibid.) On Wittgenstein’s
view, it is not clear where to locate the difference between the two experiences.
9dispositional property is for it to be arranged as the squares are in Figure 1. The
properties the intentionalist points to do not diverge in any possible world. This
proposal is also subject to the criticism I urge against the next one.
Suppose instead that we take the property of being prominent as a relational
property. E1 represents Figure 1 as having the relational property of being such
that squares 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 look prominent to the subject of E1; E2 represents
Figure 1 as having the relational property of being such that squares 2, 4, 6, and 8
look prominent to the subject of the experience. On this view, the two properties
clearlydivergeinsomepossibleworld. Theactualworldisonesuchworldatatime
at which you look at the squares and one grouping (say 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9) seems
prominent. At that time, these ﬁve squares have the relational property of seeming
prominent to you, while the other squares do not have the relational property of
seeming prominent to you at that time. That is the case because one of the relata is
an experience with a certain phenomenology, to wit, the phenomenology of E1.
Whether this is a good defense of INTENTIONALISM depends on whether look-
ing prominent is anything other than an experience’s having a certain kind of phe-
nomenal character. If it is not, then we cannot understand the property the expe-
rience’s content represents independently of the phenomenal character properties
of the experience. And in that case, the defender of INTENTIONALISM can only
defend NON-REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM by making this argument. In order to
defend REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM, one would have to show that the content
at issue can be understood independently of the phenomenal character of experi-
ence. Clearly, the same problem plagues the dispositional property proposal from
two paragraphs ago. In order to defend REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM, the dis-
positional property had better not just be that of being disposed to give rise to this
phenomenology.
So this strategy by itself does not work. We might think of the subsequent
proposals as proposals about what the content at issue is.
Second Proposal The defender of INTENTIONALISM could try this. When a
set of squares appears grouped together, that is in virtue of their appearing to have
some other feature in common. Such a feature might be that the lines of the squares
10that are prominent are thicker, or the lines of the squares that are not prominent
slightly blurrier. In that case, the contents of the two experiences diverge. Sup-
pose, for example, that the lines of the squares the subject is not attending to are
somewhat fuzzier. Then it is compatible with E1 that the lines making up square 2
are fuzzy, while this is not compatible with E2.
The tricky part of this proposal is to implement it in more detail, because the
prominent squares and the non-prominent ones share their lines. For example, in
E2, squares 2, 4, 6, and 8 are prominent. If being prominent is a matter of the
lines of the square having a certain feature, then the center square 5 should also be
prominent, since it shares all of its borders with prominent squares, and so all of
the lines making up square 5 have the prominent-making feature. So no proposal
that seeks to locate a representational difference between the experience in how the
lines are represented will work.
Third Proposal The intentionalist might focus on the squares, rather than the
lines, by likening the difference between E1 and E2 to more common cases of
visual illusion. The most promising version of this approach is to claim that E1
and E2 give different illusions of three-dimensionality. In each case, the prominent
grouping of squares visually appears slightly closer to the perceiver than the other
squares. These illusions have different contents.
But this proposal will not do, because of general features of depth perception.
If two objects subtend the same angle in a perceiver’s visual ﬁeld and one object
appears closer than the other, the apparently closer one also appears smaller.13 But
in the case of the more prominent squares, we do not observe a difference in appar-
ent size. The prominent and non-prominent squares have the same apparent size.
That strongly suggests that the squares do not appear to be at different distances.
Here we have one reason why my proposed counter-example is more forceful
than ones previously proposed, such as the Necker cube.14 While the Necker cube
can be handled by appeal to differences in the apparent distance from the perceiver,
13See Palmer (1999, pp. 315-8). Palmer offers some striking examples: see especially the ﬁgure
on p. 316.
14See e.g., Peacocke (1983, p. 16).
11mine cannot.
Fourth Proposal The intentionalist can try to argue more indirectly. There is a
large body of empirical work on the effects of attention on what a subject sees.15
If a subject attends to a particular feature of her visual ﬁeld, such as a cross dis-
played on a computer screen, she may fail to notice other easily visible features
of that ﬁeld, such as a small square displayed in the immediate vicinity of the
cross. Following Mack and Rock (1998), we can call this phenomenon inatten-
tional blindness. Furthermore, it seems apt to describe the difference between E1
and E2 by saying that we are attending to a different group of squares. This sug-
gests that a subject who attends to one grouping of squares, such as 1, 3, 5, 7, and
9, may exhibit a similar bit of inattentional blindness: she may fail, for example,
to notice small changes in the squares she is not attending to, though she would
notice the same changes were they to occur in the squares she is attending to.
The proponent of INTENTIONALISM might try to parlay these sorts of ﬁndings
into an argument that the two experiences differ in their contents. First, she will
make the following observations about what a subject is and is not inattentionally
blind to. When the subject is in E1, she is attending to one set of squares. She will
therefore be inattentionally blind to small changes in the other squares. For the
sake of deﬁniteness, let this blindness be that she will not notice if a small black
circle appears in square 2. When the subject is in E2, she is attending to another
set of squares, including square 2. Now, she will notice if a small black circle
appears in that square. The defender of INTENTIONALISM argues that from these
observations, it follows that the contents of E1 and E2 are distinct. Since the subject
would not notice the appearance of a circle in square 2 while she is in E1, the truth
of the content of E1 is compatible with the presence of the black circle; but since
she would notice the appearance of a circle in square 2 while she is in E2, the truth
of the content of E2 is not compatible with the presence of the black circle. Hence,
the truth-conditions of the two contents diverge with respect to worlds in which
there is a black circle in square 2.
However, the claims about content do not follow from the claims about what
15See for example Mack and Rock (1998).
12the subject is and is not inattentionally blind to. To make this point, just assume for
the sake of argument that the subject would not notice the appearance of a small
black circle in square 2 while she is in E1—i.e., while she experiences 1, 3, 5, 7,
and 9 as prominent. Suppose that the subject is in E1, the black circle appears in
square 2, and the subject does not notice it. In that case, the subject’s experience
does not veridically represent the world. Instead the experience misrepresents the
world as containing nine empty squares. After all, it is not as if the experience is
silent on whether there is a black circle in square 2. Therefore, even if the facts
about inattentional blindness are as the proponent of INTENTIONALISM supposes
them to be, E1 is not compatible with the presence of the black circle in square 2.
Hence, the content of E1 and E2 do not diverge.
Conclusion I conclude that PW holds. Certainly, logical space has room for
further proposals. But the ones I have considered seem to be the most compelling.
This makes a strong case for PW.
4.2 Arguing for SAMENESS
So far, I have argued that the two experiences do not diverge with respect to their
possible worlds content. This is not enough to show that their contents do not
diverge simpliciter. To make this point, I need to argue that there is no further
difference between the contents of E1 and E2, i.e., SAMENESS. In this section,
I consider three arguments against this claim and reject them. They address the
main alternative conceptions of content extant in the literature: Fregean, Russel-
lian, and centered worlds. One upshot of this discussion is that in general, we need
to already know that two content-bearing objects have different contents before we
argue about how to individuate these contents, i.e., before we argue about Russel-
lian or Fregean or possible worlds contents. I shall emphasize this point for the
special case of experience.
Fregean Contents of Experience Frege famously held that even when two sen-
tences have a content that is true in all the same possible worlds, we still need to
13distinguish these contents.16 His proposal consisted of two distinguishable parts:
a criterion for when two contentful sentences have the same content, and a pro-
posal about what sorts of abstract objects we should use to characterize the identity
conditions of the contents of sentences.
The ﬁrst argument I consider tries to generalize Frege’s criterion for when sen-
tences have different contents to experiences.17 It then goes on to argue that, by
this criterion, the contents of E1 and E2 are distinct. For the purposes of this dis-
cussion, the second part of Frege’s proposal is irrelevant. Since what matters for
this paper is only whether the contents of E1 and E2 differ, it does not matter how
to individuate them if they differ.
Crucially, in order for the criterion for different content-bearing objects to have
distinct contents to be helpful in the current dialectic, it must be such that we can
judge of two experiences whether they have the same content or not, independently
of having already decided the issue. I shall suggest that the most promising line of
extending the Fregean strategy to experience fails on just this count.
Let me begin with Frege’s original criterion for sentences. Suppose we are
given two sentences, such as “Hesperus is Phosphorus” and “Hesperus is Hespe-
rus”. It seems clear that a thinker can accept the latter without accepting the former
while being fully rational and understanding the sentences. Whenever this is the
case, we should conclude that the two sentences express different contents. This is
Frege’s criterion as applied to sentences. That is, whenever we have a pair of sen-
tences that differ in their acceptability to a rational thinker who understands them,
the sentences differ in their content. The appeal to a rational thinker is essential.
To see this, note that an active sentence and its trivial passive transformation, such
as “John killed Bill” and “Bill was killed by John” can differ in their acceptability
to some speakers, such as speakers who do not know English very well, or who are
distracted, or apathetic. But that does not show that the two sentences differ in their
content. The speakers for whom they differ in acceptability are simply irrelevant
16Frege (1997).
17Thus, Peacocke (2001) argues that experiences have Fregean contents, although they are not the
same as the contents of thought. That is why, on Peacocke’s view, it is still true that perception has
a nonconceptual content. I believe that this constitutes a change in position from the one Peacocke
defends in Peacocke (1992), which I mention below.
14for the purposes of this test.18
The notion of rational acceptability does not apply straightforwardly to experi-
ences, so the defender of INTENTIONALISM needs to generalize the criterion. She
might do so as follows:
[FREGE] Whenever two experiences differ in which beliefs it is rational to form
on their basis, they have different contents.
FREGE incorporates the requirement that the thinkers we are considering be ratio-
nal, since not just any beliefs we form on the basis of an experience will count as
relevant.
With FREGE, thedefenderof INTENTIONALISM canarguethatE1 andE2 differ
in which beliefs it is rational to form on their basis, and hence that they differ in
their contents. For example, while E1 makes it rational to believe that the squares
1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are grouped together, E2 makes rational the distinct belief that the
squares 2, 4, 6, and 8 are grouped together. Therefore, the two experiences make it
rational to form different beliefs, and hence have different contents. So they cannot
be counterexamples to INTENTIONALISM.
Unfortunately, FREGE is too strong. Suppose we have two experiences that
differ only in their phenomenal character. Clearly, one of these experiences makes
it rational to believe that what it is like to have it is likethis, while the other makesit
rational to believe that what it is like to have it is like that. For this reason, we need
to restrict the applicability of FREGE to only certain beliefs we form on the basis
of a given experience: those we form based on the content of that experience. But
we are trying to decide whether the difference between E1 and E2 is a difference
in content, and hence appeal to FREGE gets us no further along. Hence, arguing
that we can tell that E1 and E2 have different contents based on the different beliefs
they make it rational to form on their basis does not move the debate along. We
need a further argument that the difference between E1 and E2 is a difference in
content.19
18Thisrestrictiontorationalacceptability, ratherthanacceptability simpliciter, isnotcontroversial.
It is endorsed by such contemporary Fregeans as Peacocke (1992) and Evans (1982).
19An anonymous reviewer suggested the following alternative. Two experiences differ in their
15Russellian Contents of Experience The proponent of INTENTIONALISM might
suggest that the contents of experience are Russellian propositions.20 Russellian
propositions are ordered tuples of objects and properties, rather than senses, and
thus impose different identity conditions on contents.21 In the foregoing discus-
sion of Fregeanism, I distinguished two aspects of Frege’s position: a criterion for
when two contentful objects have different contents, and a proposal how best to
individuate contents, given the data the criterion delivers. Defenders of Russellian
propositions provide an alternative to the second part of the proposal, how best to
systematize our data about when two contentful objects have the same or different
content. Crucially, they usually do not offer an independent criterion—to replace
FREGE—for when two content-bearing objects have the same content.22
For example, in arguing that experience has Russellian propositions as content,
Peacocke (1992) just assumes that two experiences have different contents, and
then suggests that Russellian propositions offer the best means to capture this dif-
ference. His argument concerns the difference between two experiences one might
have in viewing Figure 3. One can either view it as a diamond, or as a square on
its tip.
Figure 3: Diamond
content just in case a rational thinker can believe that the world is the way it is represented by the
one experience but not believe that the world is the way it is represented by the other experience.
The problem with this proposal is the same as the one I raise in the text. It is precisely up for grabs
whether the experiences make different beliefs about the world rational.
20This is the view Peacocke defends in Peacocke (1992, chp. 3). He calls Russellian propositions
protopropositions.
21They need not contain objects. Existentially quantiﬁed sentences may also express Russellian
propositions, even though they do not contain any objects.
22If they offer one at all, it usually is no different from FREGE, although defenders of Russellian
propositions may differ on just which pairs of sentences come out as having different contents by
that criterion. I take it that this is one of the issues between Fregeans and Russellians about proper
names. The former, but not the latter, claim that one can accept, say, “Hesperus is Hesperus” without
accepting “Hesperus is Phosphorus”.
16Regarding the difference between these two experiences, Peacocke says this.
Intuitively, the difference between perceiving something as a square
and perceiving it as a (regular) diamond is in part a difference in the
way in which symmetries are perceived. When something is perceived
as a diamond, the perceived symmetry is a symmetry about the bi-
sectors of its angles. When something is perceived as a square, the
perceived symmetry is a symmetry about the bisectors of its sides.
[...] how do we capture the nature of the additional content that dis-
tinguishes a case in which we not only have veridical perception of a
symmetrical region but also have that symmetry perceived?
[...] I suggest that perceptual experience has a second layer of [...]
content. [...] These additional contents I call protopropositions.23
AsPeacockesaysexplicitlyinthispassage, itisanintuitivelygivenpremisethatthe
difference between perceiving ﬁgure 3 as a diamond and perceiving it as a square
is a difference in the content of the respective experiences. The only question that
is actually argued is how to capture this difference. So it is just an assumption
of the argument that the difference in experiencing Figure 3 as a diamond and
experiencing it as a square is a difference in content.
That means that considering Russellian contents of experience as opposed to
Fregean ones is a red herring. We do not need different kinds of content, we need
different arguments for countenancing a difference in the contents of the two ex-
periences E1 and E2. But since Russellians do not have different criteria for when
two content-bearing objects have different contents, the proponent of INTENTION-
ALISM gains nothing by claiming that the contents of experience are Russellian
propositions.
Of course, the defender of INTENTIONALISM could say that, just as it is in-
tuitive in the case of Figure 3 that there is a difference in the content of the two
relevant experiences, so it is also intuitive that there is a difference in the contents
of E1 and E2, respectively. Two things should be said about this move. First, I am
23Peacocke (1992, pp. 76-7), emphasis in the original. Tye (2005) endorses the same solution.
17suspicious of an unalloyed appeal to intuitions about such semi-technical notions
as representational content.
Second, defending Russellianism about the contents of experience is just half
the battle for the intentionalist. She also has to show that there are suitable proper-
ties available that distinguish E1 from E2. As I’ve already said above (section 4.1),
some properties will fail the constraints of REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM: the in-
tentionalist needs to ﬁnd properties that we can understand suitably independently
of the phenomenal contrast we are trying to account for.
To bring out the force of this point, it will be useful to distinguish my proposed
counter-example from one that seems quite similar. Consider Figure 4, another
example urged by Peacocke (1983).
Figure 4: Dots
There is a phenomenal difference between seeing the dots grouped in rows and
seeing them as grouped in columns. Proponents of the view that there is a rep-
resentational difference between the two experiences have appealed to Russellian
contents of experience.24 When we see the dots grouped as rows, we attribute the
property to the array of being made up of three rows of three dots each. When
we see the dots grouped as columns, we attribute the property of being made up
of three columns of three dots each. According to the Russellian the properties
are distinct—though they are necessarily coextensive—and hence we have differ-
ent Russellian propositions. Moreover, these properties can be understood suitably
independently of the phenomenal contrast to be accounted for.
24See for example Peacocke (1992).
18A similar treatment of my proposed counter-example would look like this. E1
attributes the property of being made up of ﬁve squares arranged as 1, 3, 5, 7, and
9 are, surrounded by four squares arranged as 2, 4, 6, and 8 are. E2 attributes the
property of being made up of four squares as 2, 4, 6, and 8 are, surrounded by ﬁve
squares arranged as 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are. But the properties attributed here are the
very same properties, and hence even on the Russellian view of propositions, E1
and E2 have the same content. Some further property needs to be attributed by E1
but not E2. The most natural one is that in E1, the ﬁve squares are prominent. But
that is just our original problem.
A different proposal appeals to different properties. The problem derives from
the fact that even when the ﬁve squares 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are prominent, the ex-
perience still represents the other four non-prominent squares. The last proposal
sought to account for that fact by attributing the content that there are four squares
surrounding the ﬁve, and that led to disaster. But we can account for the repre-
sentation of the four squares differently. According to this proposal, when the ﬁve
squares seem prominent, the experience has the following content: there is a large
square (the one containing the nine smaller ones) containing ﬁve squares arranged
as 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 are. The four non-prominent squares are simply formed by the
outlines of the large square and the ﬁve prominent ones. The content of the second
experience is then that there is a large square containing four squares arranged as
2, 4, 6, and 8 are. These two experiences have contents characterized by different
Russellian propositions.
However, even by the lights of the Russellian, these propositions mischarac-
terize the content of the two experiences. Presumably, the general principle for
attributing contents to experiences the Russellian deploys is that an experience
represents a property just in case that property is prominent. Thus, in the case of
the columns and rows of dots, the experience represents that there are three rows
just in case the three rows are prominent. Likewise, the experience represents that
there are ﬁve squares just in case the ﬁve squares are prominent. And crucially,
the experience represents that there is a large square just in case the large square is
prominent. But neither in E1 nor in E2 is the outline of the large square prominent
as a whole. That means that the experience does not represent that there is a single
19large square. And as I’ve just argued, that is a non-negotiable part of the proposal,
since without representing the large square, the experience does not represent that
there are four squares, either.
That shows that my proposed counter-example is immune from a standard in-
tentionalist response to a superﬁcially similar case. Both might be described as
exhibiting grouping phenomena, but they are importantly different. Whereas a
Russellian treatment is promising in one case, it is not promising in mine.
Centered Worlds A different argument against SAMENESS begins by observing
that perceptual content is perspectival. It makes a difference to perceptual experi-
ence where the subject of the experience is in the world. We need to capture this
fact in the content of perceptual experience, because depending on how exactly
the experience represents the spatial relations between subject and object makes a
difference to how the subject acts. One might think that for this reason, there can
be a difference in the content of two experiences without there being a difference
in the truth-value of these experiences with respect to any possible world.25
However, this is an unnecessary complication. If there is a difference in content
between E1 and E2 with respect to sets of centered possible worlds, that must be
because there is a difference with respect to some centered worlds that does not
consist merely in the position of the center. By hypothesis, the two experiences
E1 and E2 do not differ with respect to who has them, with respect to the spatial
relations of the perceiver and the ﬁgure, nor with respect to the orientation of that
perceiver. But then, there is a difference in the centered-worlds-content of E1 and
E2 only if there also is a difference in the possible-worlds content of E1 and E2.
So we cannot show that SAMENESS fails simply by pointing out that the contents
of experience ought to be individuated in terms of centered worlds rather than
uncentered possible worlds.
In making this argument, I tacitly assumed that two centers of a world are
the same if they pick out the same agent, that agent is oriented in the same way,
and that agent stands in the same spatial relations to what she sees. The reason
that these features of the center are the ones that identify the center is that these
25See Lewis (1983).
20are features that are plausibly represented in experience. And as a deﬁnitional
matter about centered-worlds content, the state represents the center as having all
of the features that go into individuating that center. Nonetheless, on purely formal
grounds, these identity conditions on centers are only one option among many.
Another option important in this discussion is this. Two centers are the same only
if the agents at the centers have experiences with the same phenomenology. On
this view, E1 and E2 would have different centered worlds contents, since they
would differ in their center. Intuitively, on this proposal, E1 tells the agent that she
is in a world in which she has a certain phenomenology, and E2 tells her that she
has a different phenomenology.26 This proposal runs afoul of the requirements of
REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM, because we pick out the content of experience by
its phenomenal character, and hence cannot understand that content independently
of its phenomenal character.
So instead of picking out the center of the centered worlds by the phenomenal
character of her experiences, the defender of INTENTIONALISM could pick out
the center by some non-phenomenal property on which the phenomenal properties
supervene, suchasphysicalorfunctionalproperties. Thiswouldallowthedefender
of INTENTIONALISM to remain with REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM and to have
a difference in the contents of E1 and E2.
There are two things to say about this proposal. First, it is a substantial claim
about the contents of experience that experiences represent these kinds of phys-
ical or functional properties. It certainly seems odd to think that it looks to us
as if we have the physical properties that some phenomenal property supervenes
on. Second, it is not clear that this is a good move for the intentionalist given the
project she is trying to carry out. If she wants to give some reductive account of
phenomenal properties, and she already assumes that phenomenology supervenes
on physical or functional properties, I cannot quite see what further work INTEN-
TIONALISM does for her. In this case, INTENTIONALISM seems to lose much of
its attraction.
26This is just a different formal representation of the idea I discussed in section 4.1, when I dis-
cussedtheproposalthattheexperiencesrepresentrelationsbetweentheagentandwhatsheislooking
at. The dialectic here is parallel to the earlier discussion.
21Conclusion I conclude that SAMENESS holds, as well. As in the case of PW,
logical space has room for further proposals. But the ones I have considered seem
to be the most compelling. With PW and SAMENESS in hand, E1 and E2 constitute
a counterexample to REDUCTIVE INTENTIONALISM, one that does not succumb
to the usual intentionalist responses. Hence, the reductive program that seeks to
reducephenomenalpropertiestocontentpropertiesfailsaswell. Othernaturalizing
properties may yet succeed.
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